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l. INTRODUCTION 
Equal protection analysis applies whenever a government appears "(a) to be 'classify-
ing persons so as to extend them unequal treatment', or (b) otherwise to be acting in a way 
which results in systematic inequality in treatment received by definable groups of per-
sons,"l Under equal protection analysis a valid classification must meet the following 
formula: "All (and only those) persons who are [classed as a group must bel similarly 
situated with respect to the purpose of the law."~ This has come to mean that the 
classification must be reasonable and all affected persons must be treated alike. 
In deciding cases under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,a 
the Supreme Court has proceeded along two tiers of review. The Court has applied either 
the "strict ~crutiny" analysis to state action which impinges upon fundamental rights or 
discriminates against a "suspect class," or the "rationality" test to a question concerning a 
legitimate state interest if neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved. Strict 
suutiny creates a prtlsumption of unconstitutionality unless a compelling state interest 
can be e&tablished, Otherwise, a challenged state action needs "to bear a rational relation 
tQ the artkulated state purpose."4 According to Justice Powell, in a question of whether a 
* Auociate Professor. PlIblic Administration Institute, Louisiana State University. Professor 
Rice is co-editor of CONTEMPORARY PIJBLIC POLICY PERSPICCTIVICS ANO BLACK AMERICANS (1984) and 
holds a National Research Council Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship for Minorities. 
1 Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7,33 (1969). 
, Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1969). 
3 The U.S. Constitution provides that: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause 
in the fifth amendment extends a similar provision to the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
4 Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE 
L.J. 328, 329 (1982). 
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fundamental right is at stake, "the answer lies in assessing whether [the right] is explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."5 Thus, tl:!e Court's first step in all equal 
protection cases is to determine whether a fundamental right, suspect class, legitimate 
state interest or rational objective is involved. The Court has defined fundamental rights 
to include voting,6 interstate travel, 7 and first amendment interests, 8 while suspect c1asses 9 
have been accorded to race,IO alienage," and ancestry.12 Under the rational test "[a] 
legislative or administrative policy that is facially neutral generally will be valid if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate public objective."13 
Nearly a century ago, in an equal protection case involving racial discrimination, the 
Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 14 recognized that neutral action, action that does not 
on its face deny any gro!:,p the equal protection of the laws, may nevertheless operate 
invidiously to discriminate against racial minorities. The case involved an ordinance 
passed by the city of San Francisco which prohibited the operation oflaundries in wooden 
buildings without consent of the Board of Supervisors. Nearly all of the laundries were 
wooden, 310 out of 340, and three-fourths were owned by Chinese immigrants. The few 
Caucasians who owned wooden laundries were granted variances to continue business 
operations. The Chinese were not granted this privilege. In focusing on the ordinance's 
"necessary tendency and ultimate actual operation," the Court ruled that the ordinance as 
applied denied the petitioners the equal protection of the law. The Court saw no reason 
for the law except for its "hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners 
belong ... " and concluded that absent a compelling justification for the discriminatory 
result, the ordinance could not stand. 15 In Yick Wo, the Court considered statistical 
documentation, along with other evidence, as prima facie proof that a facially neutral 
classification was in fact racial. This evidentiary consideration "has often been cited for 
the proposition that a racially disproportionate impact, if dramatic, will be sufficient to 
invalidate a law on equal protection grounds."16 
Disproportionate impact occurs whenever official procedures relating to selection or 
entitlement to benefits produce a less favorable result for a protected group. 17 Statistical 
5 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). 
6 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
7 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
B See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
9 The concept of suspect class originated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
10 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
11 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
12 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
13 Note, Title VI: The Impact/Intent Debate Enters the Municipal Services Arena, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
124, 128 n.20 (1980). The rational test usually consists of very minimal scrutiny of challenged policies 
and, in most cases, the courts will support the legislative acts. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A 
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979). 
14 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
15 !d. at 374. While Yick Wo was the first notable case to point out that a neutral state law can lead 
to invidious discrimination against minorities, it was not the first time the Supreme Court had 
supported a claim of racial discrimination. This honor belongs to Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1880). In Strauder the Court reversed the conviction of a black man who contended that his trial 
by a jury on which only white males were able to serve violated the fourteenth amendment. 
16 Note, Proving Intentional Discrimination in Equal Protection Cases: The Growing Burden of Proof in 
the Supreme Court, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 435, 438 (198011981). 
17 See Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 541 
(1977). 
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or other empirical evidence is necessary to show disproportionate impact. Further, the 
Court's language in Yick Wo suggests that officials charged with administering the ordi-
nance may also be held liable for its inevitable discriminatory impact. The Court stated: 
though the law may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, .... If it is 
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal 
hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal discriminations between 
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 
rights is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 18 
Seventy-five years later, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,19 the Court still supported discrim-
inatory impact as prima facie proof of racial discrimination. Seen as a leading racial 
gerrymandering case, the Alabama state legislature had redrawn the city limit boundaries 
of the city of Tuskegee from "a square to an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure" to 
exclude black voters and thereby deprive them of their voting rights. 20 The Court saw this 
"essay in geometry and geography [as an effort] to despoil colored citizens, and only 
colored citizens, ... of their enzymed voting rights."21 This bizarre configuration was 
clearly discriminatory. 
A review of both Yick Wo and Gomillion reveals that the Court did not concern itself 
with and, therefore, did not examine in great detail, the legislative purpose or intent of 
the actions in question. In Yick Wo "the Court made no reference to the intent or purpose 
of the officials who enacted the ordinance ... " and in Gomillion "the decision is devoid of 
any references to purpose or intent."22 The Court was more concerned with the obvious 
discriminatory effect of the legislative actions. 23 The issues before the Court in Yick Wo 
and Gomillion did not require the Court to make a clear articulation of the relationship 
between purpose or intent and an equal protection violation. However, more recent equal 
protection decisions by the Court have generated controversy and debate among legal 
analysts over what constitutes proof of racial discrimination. Two terms have become the 
focal point of this debate: proof of discriminatory purpose or intent"' and proof of 
discriminatory impact or effect. 25 Judicial decisions involving racial discrimination have 
involved both constitutional and statutory claims. This paper examines and analyzes the 
development and application of the purpose/intent standard in racial discrimination 
claims in both constitutional and statutory cases before the Supreme Court. The conclu-
18 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74. 
19 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
'0 The reconstructed boundaries excluded nearly all of the black voters formerly within the city 
limits. This included the entire campus of the predominately black Tuskegee Institute. !d. at 340-47. 
'lId. at 347. 
" Note, supra note 16, at 437-39. 
23 Yet even before Yick Wo and prior to Gomillion the Court had precedents that demonstrated 
that discriminatory purpose, not effect, was the touchstone of an equal protection violation. See 
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Rogers v. Alabama, 
192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1880). However, these cases, like Yick Wo and Gomillion, did not compel the Court to distinguish 
between purpose and effect. The actions were clearly undertaken for racial reasons on their face or 
discriminated in both purpose and effect. Even after the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which discriminatory purpose was expressed on the face of the 
statutes and ordinances, the Court used the equal protection clause to strike down segregated public 
facilities laws with little or no inquiry into legislative purpose. 
24 Discriminatory purpose and discriminatory intent are used interchangeably in this article. 
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sion suggests that the application of the intent standard poses an almost insurmountable 
burden of proof on minorities as they strive for full equality in American society. 
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, DISCRIMINATORY DECISION-MAKING AND DISCRIMINATORY 
PURPOSE THEORY 
One legal analyst notes that "[c]onstitutional analysis normally proceeds on the basis 
of effect." However, he further observes that "racial discrimination is treated differently 
because it is not specifically prescribed by the Constitution and because the term itself 
implies some measure of intent."26 Purposeful or intentional discrimination means that a 
decision would not have been made except for its differential impact on a racial minority. 
The decision is made without regard to the interests of minorities. 27 A decision of this type 
may be referred to as a "race-dependent decision," a decision "that would have been 
different but for the race of those benefited or disadvantaged by them."28 Any decision 
that openly employs race as a classifying trait is race-dependent. 29 Race-dependent deci-
sions can take three forms: racially motivated administration; racially motivated regula-
tions; and racially selective indifference. The first involves the discriminatory administra-
tion of a law or ordinance. The second refers to a regulation adopted for a race-
dependent motive and intentional discriminatory impact. The third involves unconscious 
actions that lead to discriminatory impacts on minorities. 30 
The party defending a race-dependent decision that disadvantages non-whites must 
establish that the decision serves a legitimate government interest, and that the decision is 
necessary to safeguard that interest. However, if a law, ordinance or decision is facially 
neutral, it is unclear whether the action or decision is race-dependent. To determine if a 
race-dependent decision is in fact race-dependent requires that a court look beyond the 
face of the decision and inquire into the actual considerations of the decision-maker. Does 
this inquiry require a court's analysis of the decision-maker's purpose or intent if the 
decision-maker is a legislative body?31 
One legal analyst points out the difficulties of finding legislative purpose and argues 
that inquiry into a legislative body's purpose is not viewed favorably by the courts for 
several reasons: 
(1) intent is frequently very difficult to find and the likelihood of error is 
great; (2) invalidation of a law that, but for its purpose, would have been valid 
may be futile, since the legislative body could re-enact it for the right reasons; 
(3) invalidating a law that, despite its racially discriminatory purpose, is a good 
25 Discriminatory effect and discriminatory impact are used interchangeably in this article. 
These terms, along with disproportionate impact, disparate effect, adverse impact or adverse effect 
are taken to mean the same thing. 
26 Samford, Toward A Constitutional Definition of Racial Discrimination, 25 EMORY L.J. 509, 574 
(1976). 
27 Purposeful or intentional discrimination can lead to discriminatory impact. Yet discrimina-
tory impact may not necessarily derive from purposeful discrimination. Discriminatory impact may 
result from an action that could plausibly serve two distinct functions. Thus discriminatory impact 
can be difficult to determine. For example, a written exam for public employment may serve the 
function of racial selection, but it also serves the function of selecting a more skilled workforce. See 
Perry, supra note 17, at 554. 
28 Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). 
29 Perry, supra note 13, at 1036 n.62. 
30 Brest, supra note 28, at 12-14. 
3. See Perry, supra note 13, at 1035-37. 
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law would be dysfunctional; (4) it is presumptuous for a court to go beyond 
the terms of a statute to try to determine what the individual legislators were 
trying to accomplish; and (5) regular judicial inquiries into purpose might 
lead legislators to become more secretive about the legislative process. 32 
5 
Considering the second and third reasons, if a legislative action has been declared 
unconstitutional because of discriminatory purpose, it is likely to be reviewed with judicial 
suspicion if the same or similar act is passed again. However, if an action such as a 
highway or road route is chosen because it initially displaces only blacks, it might be later 
chosen because it is the most economical and logical way to build the highway or road. 
This example points out that it is not the court's role to determine a good route but to 
prevent improper criteria from entering the decision-making process. 33 
If racial discrimination is viewed as an effect rather than as a cause or purpose, a 
court may wish to examine more closely the actions of an administrative body. In many 
instances it is easier to discern the purpose of an administrator's action. "Frequently he 
[the administrator] will be acting alone or as a member of a small group, and he may well 
have made a large number of similar decisions in the past which could provide a statistical 
basis for inferring purposes."34 Further, administrative actions may be easier to challenge 
than legislative actions because of the difficulty of questioning and proving legislative 
intent. 35 
Despite serious practical and theoretical shortcomings in finding legislative purpose, 
"[t]he general rule that is developing appears to be that racial discrimination in a constitu-
tional sense occurs when a legislative or administrative act purposefully disadvantages a 
racial minority." Even with this developing rule, it has been observed that "[s]anctioning 
inquiries into purpose should permit the equal protection clause to retain its vitality in 
combating racial discrimination without severely hampering legitimate legislative at-
tempts to deal with complex social problems."36 
The courts may better understand and, therefore, may better objectively discern 
discriminatory intent and its application under the equal protection clause if it makes a 
distinction between two categories of discriminatory intent, goal discrimination and 
means discrimination. Goal discrimination involves "the invidious consideration of race in 
the selection of the objective which a government policy seeks to achieve" and means 
discrimination "occurs when there is invidious consideration of race in selecting or 
weighing the method to be used in achieving that objective."37 Goal discrimination is 
objective-oriented while means discrimination is process- or method-oriented. Further, 
the courts' understanding of discriminatory intent should include an understanding of its 
application in an organizational context. This would lead the courts to develop a fuller 
comprehension of how an organization's values and concerns bring about and shape its 
specific course of actions and decisions. Moreover, when a decision or a particular course 
32 Samford, supra note 26, at 513. 
33Id. at 514. 
3. Id. at 523. 
35 However, if a single action of an administrator had a dual purpose, one racial and one 
non-racial, a court may find it difficult to conclude discriminatory racial impact. See Perry, supra note 
17; Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 38 (1982). 
36 Samford, supra note 26, at 512-13. 
37 See Schnapper, supra note 35, at 37. Schnapper also argues that the "distinction between goal 
and means discrimination makes discussion about 'unconscious' racism more intelligible. for the 
purpose of both concepts is to emphasize that discrimination may enter into government decisions in 
forms more subtle than an affirmative desire to harm blacks." Id. at 40 n.39. 
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of action is proposed, two important questions must be raised. First, what is the goal the 
proposed action seeks to achieve? Second, how and by what means will the goal be 
achieved?38 When these questions are raised in the context of governmental decision-
making, however, they create a highly complex situation; a government decision confers 
both benefits and burdens on individuals or groups. An analysis of a decision's distribu-
tional results, its benefits and burdens, may show individuals or groups being dispropor-
tionately affected. 39 Further, the burdens may not necessarily correlate with the benefits 
received, or the costs of the burdens may exceed the value of the benefits. These potential 
inequities point out the importance of conducting both goal and process analysis in 
decision-making. 40 
Since policy-making involves decisions about both goals and means, either type of 
decision could be made on a racial basis. Discriminatory goals that confer comparative 
advantages on whites h~ve been the most common type of racial goals. Another racial goal 
includes inflicting harm on a minority solely because of race even though whites receive 
no direct advantage. Race can also affect a decision about means. A choice between two 
available means, both which may be effective in achieving the goal, may be made on the 
basis of the racial consequences of each. For example, in the highway example discussed 
earlier, the highway might be built through a black rather than a predominantly white 
area, thus destroying part of the black community. While either choice (going through the 
black or white community) would achieve the goal of the needed highway, the decision-
makers chose to place the burden of displacement on the black community. In addition, 
where only one means is available to build the highway, the decision-makers may con-
clude that the means impose greater burdens than benefits on whites and, therefore, 
blacks should be the recipients of the burdens. Thus, the highway would be built if the 
only available route was through a black neighborhood but would be rejected if the only 
available route was through a white neighborhood. 
Finally, the speed of building the highway and the collateral burdens imposed by 
alternative means may be considered in racial decision-making. Decision-makers may 
38Id. at 37. 
39 In recent years numerous studies, mostly by political scientists, have proven empirically that 
inequities exist in the distribution of local government services. These studies have examined a 
number of communities across the United States including Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, 
Oakland, and San Antonio. See, B.D. JONES, SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE CITY (1980); F. LEVY, URBAN 
OUTCOMES (1974); R.L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY (1977); P.S. NIVOLA, THE URBAN 
SERVICE PROBLEM (1979); jones, Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contact: Environmental En-
forcement in Detroit, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148 (1977); jones, Service Delivery Rules and the Distribution of 
Local Government Services: Three Detroit Bureaucracies, 40 J. POL. SCI. 332 (1978); Mladenka, Citizen 
Demands and Urban Services: The Distribution of Bureaucratic Response in Chicago and Houston, 25 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 693 (1981); Mladenka, The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets 
What and the Limits to Political Control, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 991 (1980); Mladenka & Hill, The 
Distribution of Urban Police Services, 40 J. POL. SCI. 112 (1978). 
40 A number of works, most notably by political scientists and sociologists, have stressed the 
importance of studying power and the process of how decisions are made in local government 
policy-making for political explanations of the allocation and distribution of governmental benefits 
and burdens. These works can be categorized into three major headings: the elitist approach; the 
pluralist approach; and the nondecision-making approach. See, P. BACHRACH & M.S. BARATZ, POWER 
AND POVERTY (1970); R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS (1961); F. HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A 
STUDY OF DECISION-MAKERS (1953); N.W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 
(1973); R.E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS (1972). For a review of the major issues in these 
approaches see Rice, Who Rules in Local Communities: Reputation, Decision-Making, Leadership and 
Community Power Revisited, 10 J. POL. SCI. 19 (1982). 
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choose a different speed of accomplishing the goal according to whether blacks or whites 
will receive the greatest benefits or burdens. If a government has to relocate the displaced 
population in the highway's path, it might choose on a racial basis to build at a rate of two 
miles per year in the white areas but at a rate of six miles per year in the black 
neighborhoods. 41 In the final analysis "the Su preme Court must develop a more sophisti-
cated understanding of the various kinds of governmental decision-making and an 
appreciation of ways in which racist attitudes may shape official decisions."42 Clarifying 
the distinction between goal and means discrimination would constitute a helpful step in 
this process. 
Ill. THE INTENT STANDARD VERSUS THE EFFECTS STANDARD AS PROOF OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 
Since 1978 the Supreme Court has been unwilling to invalidate state action, though 
neutral on its face, that tends to perpetuate racial stereotypes, oppression and political 
impotence. In the landmark decision of Washington v. Davis, 43 the Court required that the 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that a law was conceived or maintained for a discriminatory 
purpose. Discriminatory purpose requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted 
out of a racial animus, a desire to harm.44 Yet, during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the 
Court vacillated between proof of purpose/intent and proof of effect/impact in racial 
discrimination claims. Its decisions during that time did not reflect any consistency in 
treatment of purpose or effect as a basis for challenging governmental actions on both 
constitutional and statutory grounds. By the early 1980s the Court's use of the purpose 
and effects standards, particularly in the area of statutory law, had led to a state of judicial 
confusion as cases in this area expanded from employment issues under Title VII to 
municipal service delivery disputes under Title VI. 
A. Challenges Under Constitutional Law 
In 1964 the Court in Wright v. Rockefeller 45 suggested that a showing of discriminatory 
purpose was necessary to establish a prima facie case under the equal protection clause. 
The Court was confronted with the New York State Legislature's reapportionment of 
several of Manhattan's Congressional districts which had resulted in virtually all-white 
and all-black constituencies. The black plaintiffs alleged that they had been segregated 
into separate districts and that the reapportionment adversely affected them. Absent a 
showing of discriminatory impact, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs "failed to prove that 
the New York Legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the 
districts on racial lines."46 The evidence of intent, demographic statistics and irregular 
boundaries, which was presented by the plaintiffs, was considered inconclusive and 
inadequate. In 1966 in Fortson v. Dorsey,47 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
multi-member district plan because of the absence of proof of discriminatory intent. The 
41 For a more detailed discussion on these points, see Schnapper, supra note 37, at 39-40. 
42 Id. at 58-59. 
43 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
44 See Note,Intent or Impact: Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,80 
MICH. L. REV. 1095 (1982). 
45 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
46 Id. at 53-58. 
47 379 U.S. 433 (1965)). 
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Court did indicate, however, that it might consider a plan or scheme which tended to 
cancel or dilute racial minoritys' voting strength as unconstitutional, despite the absence 
of proof of discriminatory intent. 48 
By the late 1960s the Court was unsure of the proper weight to accord the purpose or 
effect of state action that allegedly discriminated against blacks. In Reitman v. Mulkey 49 the 
Court, in a five to four decision, held unconstitutional a California constitutional amend-
ment that guaranteed homeowners the right to sell or lease their homes to anyone they 
chose. The Court concluded that the amendment encouraged and involved the state in 
private housing discrimination. Justice White, in the majority opinion, questioned both 
the amendm~ent's "ultimate impact" and its purpose. 50 The four dissenters, led by Justice 
Harlan, criticized the majority for its focus on purpose and argued that "the grounds 
which prompt administrators or state voters to repeal a law does not determine its 
constitutional validity. That question is decided by what the law does, not by what those 
who voted for it wanted it to do."5! 
In 1968 in United States v. O'Brien ,52 the Court issued broad statements in favor of the 
"impact only" standard. The Court held, "It is a familiar principle of constitutional law 
that this court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of 
alleged illicit legislative motive."53 Thus the Court upheld a conviction for draft card 
burning. The plaintiff claimed that Congress had criminalized the legislative enactment 
with the intent to suppress freedom of expression. The Court relied on the Gomillion 
decision in its opinion, stating that Gomillion actually stood "not for the proposition that 
legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the 
inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional."54 The O'Brien 
decision suggests that a motivational inquiry would be improper. 55 
A few years later in Palmer v. Thompson:6 the Court reiterated the rule from O'Brien 
that the proper area of inquiry was the "actual effect" of an action. This ruling promul-
gated the so-called "effects" test. Palmer involved the closing of all of the city's swimming 
pools by the City of Jackson, Mississippi to avoid desegregation. The Court upheld the 
action, arguing that the closings presented an equal burden to both blacks and whites. 
Black residents alleged that the action was racially motivated. Justice Black, as part of the 
majority, observed that if invalidation was based solely on motivation or intent rather than 
effect, the legislative process could be manipulated by legislators themselves or by exter-
nal forces. 51 The Court reasoned that the accusation of illicit motivation was insufficient as 
a matter of law because "no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate 
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it."58 The 
48 The Court stated: "it might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency 
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or 
cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." [d. at 439 
(emphasis added). See also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (citing Fortson, 379 U.S. 433 
(1965). 
49 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
50 [d. at 374-81. 
51 [d. at 390-91. 
52 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
53 [d. at 383. 
54 [d. at 384. 
55 [d. at 385-86. 
56 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
57 [d. at 221-24. 
58 Id. at 224. Justice White led the dissenting opinion arguing that Gomillion was a case of 
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Court's rejection of any direct inquiry into motive in O'Brien and Palmer prompted the 
seminal essays by Professors John Hart Ely·9 and Paul Brest60 of Yale University and 
Stanford University, respectively, "arguing for centrality of legislative motive in establish-
ing a constitutional violation."61 
However, in the same term as Palmer, the Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis 62 indicated that 
discriminatory intent must be considered in legislative apportionment challenges. The 
plaintiffs acknowledged that no discriminatory intent existed. In upholding a multi-
member state legislative district in Marion County, Indiana, the Court stated: "But there 
is no suggestion here that [the] multi-member district ... [was] conceived or operated as 
[a] purposeful device to further racial or economic discrimination."63 The Court held that 
underrepresentation of minorities is inherent in a republican form of government and 
the failure to win elections is not itself a violation of the Constitution. 64 The Court 
concluded that the lack of proportionate representation of minorities did not prove 
invidious discrimination "absent evidence and findings that ghetto residents had less 
opportunity than did other ... residents to participate in the political processes and to 
elect legislatures of their choices."6. 
The Court further held that the alleged discrimination was more a function of 
political party affiliation than race. The county area was largely Republican while the 
ghetto area was predominantly Democrat. Most importantly, the Court observed that the 
effects of multi-member districts were as yet undetermined and were not per se uncon-
stitutional. 66 The Court reaffirmed this reasoning in White v. Regester67 but did not hold 
that the multi-member districts in question violated the Constitution because they re-
stricted access to the political process. In examining a proposed reapportionment of 
legislative multi-member districts in Dallas, Texas, the district court ruled that two of the 
eleven proposed districts be disestablished. In those districts the district court noted 
evidence of overt past discrimination and cultural and economic realities which tended.to 
minimize the black and Mexican-American political participation. The Supreme Court 
sustained the district court's judgment. 68 
The White decision was the first time the Court upheld a claim of racial vote dilution. 
The decision suggested a comprehensive analysis of local sociological, historical, demog-
raphic, economic and political conditions - an "intensely local appraisal" - in weighing 
the constitutionality of a facially neutral law. The Fifth Circuit seemed to have combined 
the Whitcomb and White approaches in Zimmer v. McKeithen,69 where it promulgated a 
discriminatory purpose, not effect, and that purpose was relevant to judging an equal protection 
claim. Id. at 264-65. 
59 Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1207 (1970). 
60 Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, SUP. 
CT. REV. 95 (1971). 
61 Note, supra note 4, at 330. 
62 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
63 Id. at 149. 
64 Id. at 154-55. 
65 Id. Whitcomb was the first vote dilution case to be heard by the Court since Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964), which required the electoral districts for both houses in a bicameral legislature 
be as equal in population as possible. 
66 Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-60. 
67 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
68 Id. at 765-70. 
69 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit's effects test consisted of examining "primary 
factors" (e.g., effects of past discrimination) and "enhancing factors" (e.g., structural voting devices) 
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discriminatory effects test for voter dilution cases. 70 
Yet, a year later in Wright v. Council of Emporia ,71 the Court again seemed to suggest 
that discriminatory effect was the basis of proof in a claim of racial discrimination. The 
Court invalidated the withdrawal of Emporia, Virginia from the surrounding county 
school system. Emporia did not wish to follow the district court order directing the county 
system to discontinue its "freedom of choice" desegregation plan and adopt a "pairing" 
plan. The Court ruled that Emporia's withdrawal action had a discriminatory effect, 
making desegregation of the county's school more difficult. The Court explicitly stated: 
"We have focused upon the effect - not the purpose or motivation - of a permissible 
method of dismantling a system. The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an 
action that has an impermissible effect."72 
The review of cases above shows that the Court did not clearly and consistently isolate 
either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory impact as in itself violating constitutional 
rights under the equal protection clause. In some decisions the Court favored discrimina-
tory purpose, while in others it favored either discriminatory impact or both purpose and 
impact. 73 
B. Challenges Under Statutory Law 
l. Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been the principal statute for a large 
number of racial discrimination claims. Section 703 of Title VII states: 
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to (1) fail to refuse 
to hire, or discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privilege of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunity or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 14 
One problem with the language of the legislation is that Congress did not specify 
prohibition in terms of discriminatory purpose or effect. This lack of specificity had led 
the Supreme Court to interpret Title VII as embracing both concepts. 75 
that might affect a minority group's participation in the political system. [d. at 1304-06. In 1982 when 
Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act it included the Zimmer criteria in the amendment. See 
S. Comm. on the Jud., S. REP. No. 1992, S. REP. No. 417, 97th CONG., SESS 2. 
70 Zimmer aff'd on other grounds, sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 
636 (1976). 
71 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
72 [d. at 462. 
73 For other decisions that maintained the intent/impact controversy during this period, see 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
74 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1)(2), 78 Stat. 241. The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended these provisions to include state and local govern-
ments, government agencies and other political subdivisions. 
75 For further discussion on this point, see Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination 
Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981). 
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For the first seven years following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
courts applied Title VII only to intentional acts of discrimination. This meant that the 
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the employer practiced employee 
discrimination. This required the showing of the employer's illegal motive16 which could 
be inferred from the employer's "disparate treatment" of the plaintiff. 77 Beginning in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 78 the Supreme Court explicitly established for the first time the 
impact theory of racial discrimination and adopted a discriminatory effects test. The 
Court held that Title VII was specifically directed at the "consequences of employment 
practices, not simply the motivation."79 Under Title VII a private company's use of an 
employment test that excludes a markedly disproportionate number of blacks was unlaw-
ful, unless the company showed that the test was job related. 
In Griggs the employer required that all prospective employees for its "desirable" 
positions had to have a high school diploma and pass two intelligence tests. 80 Neither 
requirement measured the applicant's ability to perform any particular job. The company 
did not make any attempt to demonstrate the validity of the selection methods, but 
instead argued that their lack of discriminatory intent should render them immune from 
suits under Title VII. The Court stated that "both requirements operate[d] to disqualify 
Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants [and] [i]f an employment 
practice which operate[d] to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited."81 The effects test adopted in Griggs required the 
plaintiff to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that the defen-
dant employer's hiring or promotion criteria, though facially neutral, had a statistically 
disproportionate impact on a protected group.82 When statistical data showed a dispro-
portionate impact the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to justify the selection or 
promotion criteria on the grounds of business necessity or the existence of a manifest 
relationship to some legitimate interest of the defendant. 83 Despite the Court's finding of 
discriminatory impact, this finding was not to be the consistent ruling in future Title VII 
cases. 
In the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 84 decided two years after Griggs, the 
Supreme Court enunciated the "disparate treatment" theory of discrimination under 
Title VII. Unlike disparate impact, disparate treatment requires a finding of discrimina-
76 Note, The Bottom Line Defense in Title VII Actions: Supreme Court Rejection in Connecticut v. Teal 
and a Modified Approach, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1983). 
77 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
78 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
79 [d. at 432. 
80 [d. at 425. 
81 [d. at 426, 428-31. These requirements were facially neutral because they did not refer to the 
applicant's race. Duke Power Company was divided into five departments: (1) labor, (2) local 
handling, (3) operations, (4) maintenance, and (5) laboratory and testing. Applicants for all positions 
in all departments except labor had to meet the test and diploma requirements. Current employees 
could transfer from labor or coal handling to the other three departments by passing the two tests, 
even if they did not have a high school diploma. 
82 The Court noted the following disparate effects: (1) the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission 
in one particular instance had found that 58 percent of whites but only 16 percent of blacks passed 
the two tests, and (2) in North Carolina, the U.S. Bureau of the Census statistics showed that only 34 
percent of white males and only 12 percent of black males had completed high school. [d. at 430 n.6. 
83 See Note, supra note 13, at 130; Belton, supra note 75, at 1277. 
84 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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tory purpose. 85 The decision, however, did not reverse Griggs because the facts of the 
cases were different. 86 In fact the Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas did contain similar 
dicta to Griggs. For example, the Court reiterated that the complainant in a discrimination 
case must initially carry the burden to prove discrimination and the defendant's basic 
defense requires the showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The Court also 
reaffirmed in McDonnell Douglas the premise on which Griggs was decided by noting that 
the ultimate goal of Title VII is the elimination of "discriminatory practices and devices 
which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority 
citizens."87 
Two years later in 1975, the Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 88 reaffirmed the 
disparate impact principle enunciated in Griggs, that the plaintiff has the initial burden of 
proving disparate impact. In Albemarle the Court once again was faced with a company 
that utilized selection and testing practices that left "Negro employees 'locked' in lower 
payingjob classifications."89 Although the company made an attempt at a validation study, 
its results were not convincing to the Court. Thus the Court affirmed the general job 
relatedness standard of Griggs by rejecting the employer position that the requirements 
were job related, while endorsing specific methods of demonstrating validity. 
After Albemarle the Court again vacillated and reaffirmed disparate treatment in the 
employment cases of Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters 90 and Teamsters v. United States. 9 ! 
Most significantly, in Teamsters the Court required that proof of discriminatory purpose 
was necessary in Title VII cases involving a seniority system. It also clearly distinguished 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact: 
'Disparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. 
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory 
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere 
fact of differences in treatment .... 92 Claims of disparate treatment may be 
distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' The latter involve 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different 
groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive, 
we have held is not required under a disparate-impact theory .... Either 
theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts. 93 
85 According to the Court, to establish a prima facie disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must 
show: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 
[d. at 802. 
86 In Griggs the Court focused on prior discriminatory history of blacks as a racial group and its 
effect on testing, while in McDonnell Douglas it did not. [d. at 806. 
87 [d. at 800. 
88 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The employer required that all applicants for skilled jobs have a high 
school diploma and pass two intelligence tests. 
89 [d. at 409. 
90 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
9. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
92 [d. at 335 n.15. 
93 [d. at 336 (citations omitted). During the same year the Court was faced with the disparate 
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The disparate impact principle in employment discrimination cases resurfaced in the 
early 1980s when some employers attempted to defeat disparate impact claims with a 
"bottom line defense."94 "The bottom line defense is applicable when one step in a 
multi-step hiring or promotion process has a disparate impact on a protected class but the 
overall process is nondiscriminatory."95 In other words, the employer may recognize that 
a selection device had a disparate impact and hires (or perhaps overhires) enough of the 
protected groups to prevent aprimafacie claim of racial discrimination. Until 1982judicial 
and administrative acceptance had been given to the bottom line principle. 96 A number of 
lower court decisions had held that a nondiscriminatory bottom line was an absolute 
defense to a disparate impact claim. 97 Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, the federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII, had accepted nondiscriminat-
ory bottom line results. 98 In 1982 the Supreme Court faced for the first time the bottom 
line concept. 
In Connecticut v. Teal 99 a group of black plaintiffs alleged that the State of Connecticut 
Department of Income Maintenance's two-step selection process for supervisors violated 
Title VII as interpreted in Griggs. The state, using the bottom line concept, hired a larger 
percentage of black supervisors which exceeded the percentage of blacks who passed the 
test. The state used the bottom line as its defense and argued that since the bottom line 
was more favorable to blacks than to whites, the test did not have a disparate impact on 
blacks because the state had met the eighty percent rule. 100 The district court accepted the 
impact principle as a basis for review in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Although there 
was statistical evidence of disparate impact, plaintiff did not prevail because of the finding that sex 
was a "bona fide occupational qualification." For other disparate impact cases during the later 1970's, 
see Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) and New York City Transit 
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
94 In 1978 several federal agencies developed a four-fifths or eighty percent rule which took 
effect on September 25, 1978, to determine whether an employer'S selection procedures violated 
Title VII. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Department of Justice, Civil Service 
Commission (now Office of Personnel Management) and the Office of Revenue Sharing of the 
Department of the Treasury promulgated the four-fifths rule under the Uniform Guidelines Em-
ployee Selection Procedures 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979). According to this rule a prima facie violation of 
Title VII is made out if the rate at which minorities are hired or promoted is less than four-fifths or 
eighty percent of the nonminority hiring rate. This rule has been commonly referred to as the 
"bottom line test" or "bottom line principle." See generally, Note, The Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures: Compromises and Controversies, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 605 (1979). 
95 Note, supra note 76, at 738. 
96 For a discussion of the evolution of the "bottom line concept" see Blumrosen, The Bottom Line 
Concept in Equal Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 1 (1980) and Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in 
Equal Employment Guidelines: Administering a Polycentric Problem, 33 AD. L. REV. 323 (1981). 
97 See, e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound, 635 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Navajo Ref. Co., 593 
F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979). 
98 Note, supra note 76, at 739 n.25. 
99 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The plaintiffs in Teal were four black females of the Department of 
Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut. Each had been provisionally promoted to a position 
of supervisor and sought to attain permanent status. The state's two-stage selection process required 
candidates to first pass a written test in order to advance to the second stage. The plaintiffs ,failed the 
exam and therefore could not advance to the second stage. The written test had a disparate impact 
on black candidates; about 80% of the white candidates and 54% of the black candidates passed.ld. at 
443 n.4. 
100 ld. at 447 n.7. The state appointed the passing candidates, which resulted in a black 
promotion rate of about 23 percent as compared to a white promotion rate of 13.5 percent. Overall, 
the number of blacks promoted to supervisory positions was close to 170 percent of the number of 
whites. ld. at 444 n.6. 
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state's line of reasoning while the Second Circuit did not. The Second Circuit ruled that 
the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact and remanded the case 
to the district court to determine whether the written test was job related. lOl 
The Supreme Court in a five to four decision affirmed the -court of appeals by noting 
that the employer's nondiscriminatory bottom line did not preclude the employees from 
establishing a primafacie case of disparate impact under Title VII as it had enunciated in 
Griggs. The majority reasoned that the bottom line did not prevent discrimination job 
opportunities and a test at any stage in the employee selection process could have a 
disparate impact regardless of bottom line hiring results.I02 Further, the Court continued 
its line of reasoning developed in Albemarle that Title VII "focuse[s] on employment and 
promotion requirements that create ... discriminatory bar[s] to opportunities ... [rather 
than] on the overall number of minority or female applicants actually hired or pro-
moted."lo3 The Court also noted in Teal that Title VII "[protects] the individual employee, 
rather than ... the minority group as a whole."lo4 On the contrary, the bottom line 
defense would permit an employer to discriminate against one minority group member at 
the expense of providing better treatment to other members of the same group.I05 
The cases reviewed above point out that the Supreme Court has not been consistent 
in its applications of the intent and effects standards under Title VII. In Griggs the Court 
saw Title VII as a Congressional mandate to adopt the disparate impact standard when 
professionally developed tests are at issue. Yet, in Teamsters the Court interpreted this 
same provision as requiring proof of discriminatory purpose in cases involving claims that 
seniority systems are unlawful under Title VIJ.106 Nevertheless in Furnco the Court 
101 Connecticut v. Teal, 645 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
102 Teal, 457 U.S. ct 448. 
103 Id. at 450. 
104 Id. at 453-54. 
105 The Court previously rejected this approach in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
at 579. However, the majority in Teal failed to note that Furnco involved disparate impact. The four 
dissenters, led by Justice Powell, noted this difference and argued that disparate impact cases are 
concerned with group, not individual harm, and as a result Title VII does not permit the bottom line. 
See Teal, 457 U.S. at 457-58. This observation seems to suggest that disparate impact focuses on 
group harm and disparate treatment on individual harm. 
Equally interesting is the fact that the Teal Court did not discuss United Steelworkers of America 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber the Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action program on 
the part of Kaiser Aluminum and the local union. The Court's reasoning in Weber seems to fit more 
closely with Teal's emphasis on a group concept of equality. However, the Court's overlooking of 
Weber, according to one legal observer, may have been due to the fact that in Weber "the challenge was 
pressed by a white employee and did not seem to present a significant potential for harming a 
subclass of blacks." See Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact 
Theory and the Demise oj the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 355 (1983). 
106 In June 1984 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, in Firefighters 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.W. 4767 (U.S. June 12, 1984) where it held that Title VII 
protects bona fide seniority systems and it is inappropriate to deny an innocent employee the benefits 
of his seniority in order to provide a remedy in a pattern. Justice White delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Black plaintiffs alleged that the Memphis Tennessee Fire Department and certain city officials 
were engaged in a pattern of making hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race in violation 
of Title VII. Thereafter a consent decree was implemented with respect to blacks. Subsequently, the 
city, faced with a blidgetary crisis, required a reduction of city employees and the Fire Department 
elected to follow its seniority system. The U.S. district court for the Western District of Tennessee, in 
modifying the consent decree, ruled that the layoffs would have a discriminatory effect and the 
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emphasized disparate treatment but suggested that a finding of discrimination depends 
upon which standard is given precedence in a particular case. Finally, in Teal the Court 
seemed to merge the two concepts when it used disparate treatment cases to support its 
ruling of disparate impact in refuting the bottom line defense. 
2. Title VI and Municipal Services 
The purpose/effect debate concerning statutory law has now expanded to include 
municipal service claims involving Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 107 Section 601 
of Title VI reads as follows: 
No persons in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance. 
An important case in this area involved the fiscal crisis of New York City in the late 1970s. 
In an attempt to reduce expenditures and increase the efficiency of its municipal services 
the city decided to close Sydenham Hospital located in a black and Hispanic neigh-
borhood. In Bryan v. Koch 108 a class action suit was brought by local minority residents to 
prevent the closing of the hospital on grounds that the closing violated Title VI. Tradi-
tionally, this provision has been used to remedy discrimination in federally funded 
education, employment, and housing programs. 109 Yet, Congress, it would seem, clearly 
intended for Title VI to apply to health facilities. 110 The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is charged with the enforcement 
function of Title VI.111 Yet, as in Title VII, the language of Title VI does not clearly 
define discrimination and does not clearly indicate if discrimination under the provision 
should be based on discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect. However, OCR 
enforcement efforts have focused on discriminatory effect. 112 
In Bryan, after a careful analysis and review of its municipal hospital system, New 
York City had decided to close Sydenham Hospital primarily for economic reasons. 113 
The plaintiffs contended that the decision to close the hospital was discriminatory because 
the hospital's patients were 98 percent minorities as compared to 66 percent minorities 
served by the New York City Hospital System as a whole. The district court ruled in favor 
of the city, noting that: 
seniority system was not bona fide. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
action on the consent decree. 
107 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
108 492 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 627 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
109 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress has the power to tie the receipt of 
federal funds to the recipient's compliance with federal statutory and administrative directives. See, 
e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See also Note, 
supra note 13, at 127 n.5. 
llO Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights Within the jurisdiction of the United States, 1963: 
Hearings before Subcomm. No.5 or the House Comm. on the judiciary, Parts I, II, III, and IV, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1963). 
III For a discussion of the role of OCR in civil rights enforcement in health care, see M. Rice, 
Black Health Care Public Policy and the Courts: A Civil Rights Perspective, Ouly, 1984) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
112 Id. at 7-8 and 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b) (2) (1980). 
ll3 627 F.2d at 614-18. 
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The Government's approach proves that simplicity is not always a virtue .... 
Any recipient of federal funds, from any Title VI agency, could be required 
to justify reducing any service, even if overall service increased, where the 
service is utilized by a minority population proportionately greater than the 
minority population served by the system as a whole .... [T]he standard 
would apply to any minority group, and since many ethnic groups tend to live 
in close geographic proximity, many decisions to modify virtually any form of 
service or facility, would be affected. In fact, since we are speaking of Title VI, 
it is far from clear that the standard could be applied only to minorities; the 
Act prohibits discrimination against any race .... The fact is that almost any 
decision to close any federally funded supported facility or to reduce any 
federally supported service will adversely affect one group disproportionately 
more than some other group.U4 
The district court also made a distinction between the concepts of "adverse effect" 
and "racially disparate impact." The court inferred that adverse impact may exist 
whenever an inner city hospital closing occurs. Disparate impact, that is probative of 
discriminatory motive, however, requires more than proof of adverse effects. us Addi-
tional evidence of adverse effects was not substantiated by the court for two reasons. First, 
the city made one decision to close the hospital, not a series of independent decisions that 
could possibly establish racial discrimination. Second, since the city had taken steps to 
ensure alternative service that was equivalent to the service that was eliminated, this 
eliminated any real adverse effects. u6 Thus, from the standpoint of intent, the district 
court found no violation of Title VI. Upon appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court's ruling. It did so, however, under an effects test. 117 Although the Bryan decision was 
unfavorable to plaintiffs, it does suggest that a minority resident has a right to question a 
municipality's budgetary decisions under Title VI where federal funds are involved if 
these decisions seem to have a disproportionate impact. us 
IV. THE DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE STANDARD IN CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
In Washington v. Davis U9 the Supreme Court in a seven to two decision held that only 
purposeful or intentional discrimination shown by "a totality of relevant facts" could 
violate equal protection; a mere showing of disproportionate impact would not be 
sufficient. The Court, however, failed to state what other "relevant facts" it considered 
important. Simply stated, the Court held in Davis that the equal protection clause prohib-
its only government action undertaken with a discriminatory purpose. The case involveq 
the District of Columbia's police department qualifying test, known as "Test 21" devel-
oped by the U.S. Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management) for 
114 492 F. Supp. at 235. 
115 Id. at 236. 
116Id. at 237-38. 
117 627 F.2d at 620. 
118 The courts have already noted that unequal municipal service delivery based on race violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. However, they have not clearly define9 what constitutes unequal service 
delivery and what factors and measurement indicators are to be used. See Rice & Jones, Municipal 
Seroice Suits, Local Public Seroices and Seroice Equality, 14 M.W. REV. PUB. AD. 29 (1980); Rice, 
Inequality, Discrimination and Seroice Delivery: A Recapitulation for the Public Administrator, 1 INT'L J. PUB. 
AD. 409; Rice, Public Law and Equality in Local Government Seroices, in THE PUBLIC ENCOUNTER: WHERE 
STATE AND CITIZEN MEET, 126 (C. Goodsell ed. 1981). 
119 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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general use throughout the federal service. The failure rate of black candidates was over 
four times as high as the failure rate of whites. Black plaintiffs charged that the test had a 
highly discriminatory impact in screening out black applicants. They made no claim of 
purposeful or intentional discrimination. The district court upheld that test. 120 
In the decision, the Court did not consider its previous rulings in Palmer, O'Brien, and 
Gomillion to be similar in circumstances. Under these cases the Court had imposed the 
impact standard. The Court stated in Davis that in these previous decisions "it had never 
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it 
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
discriminatory impact." The Court also stated, however, the "[d]isproportionate impact is 
relevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden 
by the Constitution."121 
Justice Stevens, who concurred with a different rationale, argued that "[i]t is unrealis-
tic to require the victim of alleged effect discrimination to uncover the actual subjective 
intent of the decision-maker, or conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action 
because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional 
process."122 However, the majority reasoned that "an impact-only standard would throw 
into doubt the constitutionality of any neutral law that happened to disadvantage 
minorities, even if the effect was only incidental."123 Using this line of reasoning, the 
Court in Davis had "difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral 
qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any per-
son ... equal protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail 
to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groupS."124 Further, the Court also 
feared that a contrary result in Davis "would raise serious question about ... a whole 
range of ... statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and [thus] to the average 
black man than to the more affluent white."12S If the Court had ruled that "the existence 
of disproportionate impact alone [was] sufficient to ... weighing governmental interests 
, .. [then] legislatures and other governmental bodies would be unable to act conclusively 
whenever it was foreseeable, or even conceivable, that a choice might have a greater-
than-ayerage adverse effect on a 'protected group'."126 
Laws that create express racial classification are now rare, and the significance of 
Davis for modern equal protection litigation lies not in what the decision says about these 
laws, but what it says about laws with facially neutral provisions. The Davis decision 
indicate& that discriminatory purpose will be difficult to prove in these kinds of cases. For 
120 P~vis v. WashillRton, 348 F. SI}{lp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972). From the. period 1968 to 1971, the test 
c¥cluded 57 percent of ~he black applicants and only 13 percent of the white applicants. Outside of 
the District of Columbia in 1970-71, the failure rate of blacks was 47 percent; whites 12 percent. 
Police recruits were required to receive a grade of at least 40 out of 80 on the test in order to be 
accepted into the police department's training program. In a split decision the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court by holding that the test of racially disproportionate 
impact placed a heavy burden on the defendant to prove that the test was related to actual job 
performance. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975) at 958-59 n.20 and Davis, 426 
U.S. at 234-35. 
121 Davis, 426 U.S. 229 at 245. See also Note, supra note 16, at 443. 
122 Davis, 426 U.S. at 253. 
123 Id. at 244. 
124 Id. at 245. 
125 Id. at 248. 
126 Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Discriminatory Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1376, 1384 and n.46 (1979). 
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the Court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, the opinion seems to suggest that the disparate 
impact on minorities must be overwhelming to permit an inference of discriminatory 
purpose. Yet, in Davis the Court, while requiring the presence of discriminatory purpose, 
did not provide much practical guidance as to how it was to be ascertained. The Davis 
opinion did not explicitly state whether discriminatory purpose must be the dominant 
claim in order for government actions to violate the equal protection clause, especially if 
these actions also appear to serve legitimate government interests. Subsequently, the 
Court addressed these issues by further applying and refining the discriminatory purpose 
requirement one year later. 
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 127 the Court, while 
reiterating some of the Davis language, provided additional insight into possible methods 
of proving discriminatory purpose. The case involved the Arlington Heights Planning 
Commission of the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois' denial of a rezoning petition to 
the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation for federal subsidized housing in 
the virtually all white Chicago suburb. Three black prospective tenants sued Arlington 
Heights and its board of trustees alleging that the Village violated the equal protection 
clause because the purpose and effect of the refusal to rezone was the perpetuation of 
racial segregation in Arlington Heights. The district court decided in favor of the 
defendant. In a 2 to 1 decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed by noting 
that the plaintiffs had established a discriminatory effect/disproportionate impact on 
blacks. us The Supreme Court, in a majority of five Justices, reversed because the plaintiff 
failed to establish that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's 
decision. 
Recognizing Justice Stevens' concerns in his Davis concurrence, the Arlington Heights 
Court observed that legislative and administrative action is rarely motivated "solely by a 
single concern" and that of a partial discriminatory purpose would satisfy the purpose 
requirement. 129 The Court then offered the kinds of evidence that might be probative of 
discriminatory purpose. One interpretation of the Court's language suggests that the 
purpose standard would involve 
sensitive inquiry into ... circumstantial and direct evidence ... the historical 
background of the challenged decision, the sequence of events leading to the 
decision, any departures from the normal procedural sequence attending the 
decision, any substantial departures from established law or policy of the 
community, and whatever legislative or administrative history is available 
including statements of officials, reports, and testimony.130 
An inquiry of this nature and extent may seem to be what the Court meant in Davis by a 
totality of relevant facts; purpose could be proven only by a combination of many 
different kinds of evidence. This would appear to include an examination of the subjec-
tive consequences of their actions. However, the Court did note that an examination of 
lawmakers' motivation must be approached with caution. An inquiry into motives, in the 
Court's words, represents "a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of 
government and placing a decision-maker on the stand is therefore 'usually to be 
avoided'." 131 
127 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
128 Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975). 
129 429 U.S. at 265-66. (Emphasis in original). 
130 Note, supra note 16, at 445-46. 
131 429 U.S. at 268 n.18. 
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One significant aspect of the Arlington Heights opinion was that it affirmed that the 
discriminatory purpose requirement articulated in Davis applied to all types of racial 
discrimination claims under the equal protection clause. However, whereas Davis dealt 
with whether and how the plaintiff proves discriminatory purpose, Arlington Heights 
demonstrated that even after discriminatory impact has been established it must derive 
from a "motivating factor" to discriminate.13~ Otherwise, "the government may still 
prevail by proving that the same action would have resulted in the absence of the 
discriminatory purpose."133 
The Court continued to apply the purpose standard in Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney. 134 The plaintiffs contended that the statutory preference given to 
veterans in filling state jobs discriminated against women. The Court refused to find that 
the government's action involved unconstitutional discriminatory intent. Although the 
district court considered the intent standard, it invalidated the veterans' prefereftce 
largely on the grounds that the preference had the natural, foreseeable and inevitable 
effect of producing a discriminatory impact. 135 The Supreme Court noted that: 
'Discriminatory Purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of circumstances. It implies that the decision-maker, in this case a 
state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group. Yet nothing in the retord demonstrates that this prefer-
ence for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it 
would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and 
predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service. 136 
In short the Court concluded that a foreseeable disparate impact was not by itself 
dispositive of whether discriminatory intent was present. 
V. DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE AND VOTER DILUTION 
In racial redistricting claims the intent standard articulated in Davis and Arlington 
Heights has placed the validity of analyzing objective effects of voter dilution in doubt. The 
Supreme Court adopted the Davis and Arlington intent requirement in the City of Mobile v. 
Bolden 137 as a major consideration in challenges to an at-large voting system. The case 
involved a class action suit brought by black citizens of Mobile challenging the constitu-
tionality of the at-large method of electing city commissioners. Specifically, the complain-
ants alleged that at-large elections "discriminate[d] against black residents of Mobile in 
that their concentrated voting strength [was] diluted and cancelled out by the white 
majority in the city as a whole."138 The complainants sought relief in part under the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to abolish the city's at-large commission 
system. 139 
132 Id. at 265-70. 
133 See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal 
Protection l.itigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 1021 (1977). 
134 442 U.s. 256 (1979). 
135 Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 149-50 (D. Mass. 1978). 
136 442 U.S. at 279. 
137 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
138 Bolden, 423 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D. Ala. 1976). 
139 The complainants also sought relief under the fifteenth amendment and § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, et seq. Id. at 385. 
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The plaintiffs offered evidence that racial bloc voting, "white backlash," prevented 
black candidates or even white candidates who sought black votes from winning. 140 
Although blacks at that time comprised about thirty five percent of the city's popula-
tion,'4' no blacks had served on the city commission since its inception in 1911. The 
district court, employing the discriminatory effects test, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs by 
rejecting the defendant's claim that in Davis proof of intent was necessary.142 The district 
court ordered a new mayor/council form of local government with a single member 
district system. The Fifth Circuit affIrmed. '43 While noting that a showing of discrimina-
tory intent was necessary, the Fifth Circuit in relying on its decision in Zimmer v. McKeith-
en observed th<lt the evidence showing discriminatory effect was probative of discrimina-
tory intent. '44 
A divided Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 145 The Court stated "only if there 
is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment."'46 However, the Court did acknowledge that discriminatory 
effect is the necessary first step in an intent inquiry. But in Mobile the Court made it clear 
that the effect must be so overwhelming as to permit an inference of intent. The absence 
of blacks on the Mobile City Commission was merely a result of an electoral system that 
would "tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority."147 
The plurality based its judgment on Davis and Arlington Heights but it did not use the 
"totality of the circumstances" test it articulated in detail in Arlington Heights. 148 Further, 
Justice White in dissent noted that the Court even rejected the "intensely local appraisal" 
test it had promulgated in White. '49 In other words, in Mobile the plurality gave little 
significance to social and historical evidence because the facts in the two cases were 
different. Mobile marked "the first time that the Court explicitly rejected the use of 
historical evidence in the intent inquiry."'5o 
Justice Marshall, also in dissent, observed that Davis and Arlington required proof of 
discriminatory intent in claims involving the distribution of government benefits, e.g., 
employment and housing, for which there was no constitutional entitlement. Justice 
Marshall saw the right to vote, which was the major issue in Mobile, as a fundamental right 
and would have required a showing of discriminatory effect. '5' in conclusion, given the 
Court's decision in Mobile, a facially neutral state action will not be invalidated unless it is, 
according to one observer, 
shockingly oppressive, anachronistic and inexplicable on other than racial 
grounds. Subtler mechanisms of discrimination, under this standard, must 
140 Id. at 388. 
141 Id. at 386. 
142 The district court relied on the discriminatory effects test promulgated by the Fifth Circuit in 
Zimmer v. McKeithen. Id. at 383-98. See also supra notes 69 and 70. 
143 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978). 
144 !d. at 246. 
145 Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Justice Stewart wrote for a plurality of four, Blackmun concurred 
in the result, Stevens concurred in the judgment, and Brennan, White and Marshall dissented. 
146 !d. at 66. 
147 Id. at 74. 
148 !d. at 73-75. 
149 Id. at 95. 
150 See Note, supra note 16, at 458. 
151 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 108-11, 113-14. 
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inevitably escape constitutional scrutiny. Absent a legislative solution, the 
result may well be continued second-class citizenship without a remedy.152 
21 
After Mobile, the lower courts have shown evidence of confusion in attempting to 
apply the Supreme Court's discriminatory intent standard. For example, the Fifth Circuit, 
which had decided most of the significant equal protection cases in the 1970s in one panel 
recognized a more rigorous test utilizing a more fact intensive version of the White test, 153 
while another panel asserted that Mobile failed to provide a "clear holding on the need to 
prove discriminatory intent in order to establish a violation of the Constitution." 154 
Further, the Fifth Circuit in Lodge v. Buxton 155 provided a detailed examination and 
analysis of Mobile and upheld the district court's review of the social and historical voting 
conditions of blacks and considered these as a part of the "totality of the circumstances" 
for proof of discriminatory purpose.156 The Supreme Court had rejected this test in 
Mobile. To draw a distinction between its holding and that of the Supreme Court in Mobile 
the Fifth Circuit focused on the facts in Mobile and stated that the "evidence adduced was 
insufficient to allow an inference of discriminatory purpose."157 Upon review in 1982 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and therefore endorsed once again the "totality 
of the circumstances" test in proving discriminatory intent. 158 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legislatures are expected to take actions that will not equally benefit all groups. This 
IS "the nature of the process."159 "Even where all citizens benefit from an action the 
burdens will not necessarily correlate with the benefits received by each, and in some 
individual cases, the costs of the burdens may exceed the value of the benefits." 160 Under 
the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court's evaluation of legislative actions consist 
of ensuring that the considerations the legislature takes into account are legitimate ones, 
that is, the actions must not run counter to the specific protections of the Constitution. 
Equal protection claims brought to the Court in earlier years required the Court to focus 
on official action that was obviously intended to discriminate in purpose, effect or both. 
As a result, the court was not faced with a choice between intent and effect to decide these 
claims. Yet, with the adoption of the intent standard in Davis and its progeny, the Court 
gave constitutional protection to entrenched legislative practices and resulting actions that 
systematically disadvantaged blacks. The Court extended and applied the intent standard 
to statutory claims originating under Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Thus, the Davis decision marked the beginning of a new "troubling area" in civil 
rights law. History has shown that discrimination exists in both covert and overt forms. 
The requirement in Davis that a plaintiff prove that he or she was subjected to intentional 
discrimination overlooks the subtleties and realities of racism. In other words, "the intent 
doctrine defines the past as a tabula rasa immune from constitutional attack."161 Further, 
152 See Note, supra note 16, at 452. 
153 See Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d 1191, 1194 (5th Cir. 1981). 
154 Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1981). 
155 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981). 
156Id. at 1374-81. 
1;7 Id. at 1374. 
158 Rogers v. Lodge, sub nom., 454 U.S. 811 (1982). 
159 Note, supra note 126, at 1383. 
160 Schnapper, supra note 35, at 37. 
161 Note, supra note 4, at 351. 
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by requiring the victims of discrimination to establish the motives of institutional actors 
through higher burdens of proof, the Court may have precluded effective remedies. The 
intent standard may have established a right for which there is no remedy. As the Court 
itself noted a hundred years ago in Paintdexter v. Greenhaw, 162 "[t]o take away all remedy 
for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself." 163 
162 114 U.S. 270 (1885). 
163 [d. at 303. 
